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Anti-Federalism is generally thought to represent a major "road not
taken" in our political history. The Anti-Federalists, after all, lost the
great debate in 1787-88, while their opponents' constitution prevailed
and prospered over the years. If we needed proof of the staggering vic-
tory of the Federalist Constitutional project, the 200th anniversary cele-
brations of 1987 would certainly seem to have given it, at least insofar as
victory is measured by longevity and adulation.'
One of the most imposing signals of the Federalists' triumph is the
manner in which their constitution has come to dominate the very rheto-
ric of constitutionalism. This is particularly the case in the United
States, where the federal Constitution has the status of what might be
called the "plain vanilla" brand-a brand so familiar that it is assumed
to be correct for every occasion. This Constitution is the standard by
which we understand and judge other constitutions, as for example those
of states and localities. 2 Indeed, the federal Constitution's rhetorical
dominance extends to some degree even to other parts of the world, when
foreign citizens look to it for guidance about their own governmental
structures.
3
What, then, might be left over for the defeated Anti-Federalists?
This Article is an effort to reconsider the degree to which the Anti-Feder-
alist road may still be trod after all, and in particular to reconstruct some
* Professor of Law, Yale University. A.B., Antioch College (1962); M.A., University of Chi-
cago (1963); Ph.D., Cornell University (1969); J.D., University of Chicago (1977). The author
wishes to thank Bruce Ackerman, Greg Alexander, Frank Michelman, William W. Fisher and the
members of the Harvard Seminar on Law and Governance for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
I Cf. M. KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF 3-5 (1986) (popular adulation of
the Constitution).
2 See., e.g., Waggoner, Log-Rolling and Judicial Review, 52 U. COLO. L. REv. 33, 42-43 (1980);
Note, City Government in the State Courts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1596, 1597-99 (1965) (comparing
local governmental institutions unfavorably to federal ones with respect to protection of individual
rights).
3 M. KAMMEN, supra note 1, at 93 (19th century Russian and Latin American governments
looked to U.S. federal constitutional model, along with those from France and Spain).
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elements of Anti-Federalism that have been incorporated into a tradition
of local autonomy. This Article will argue, among other things, that
Americans do have a tradition of localism, and that this tradition rests
on a rather different, and indeed much older, version of constitutionalism
than the one that is often associated with the Federalists' plain vanilla
Constitution.
I will try, first of all, to get at that older tradition by illustrating the
ways in which the Federalist version of constitutionalism clashed with it;
in that connection I will try to locate Federalist constitutionalism histori-
cally and theoretically in the eighteenth century Western political topog-
raphy. Here I will consider most particularly the Anti-Federalist claim
that the proposed Federalist Constitution was "monarchical," and will
point out the parallels between European monarchic projects and the
centralizing and commercializing aspects of Federalism. Next, I will dis-
cuss the ways in which the Anti-Federalists elaborated at least some ele-
ments of the older version of constitutionalism. I will then argue that
this older version of constitutionalism has continued to survive locally,
despite an intellectual environment that is dominated by Federalist rhet-
oric to this day. Finally, however, I will argue that the localist tradition
has also been affected by its complex symbiosis with the centralizing and
commercializing Federalist program.
I. THE "PLAIN VANILLA CONSTITUTION" AND
THE "ANCIENT CONSTITUTION"
Without question, the Federalists' "plain vanilla" constitutional
model contains innumerable ambiguities, and always has.4 Without
question too, there have been quite far-ranging attacks on the original
plain vanilla model, and departures from it as well. Several legal scholars
have argued recently that these departures have occurred particularly in
this century, as the national governing scheme incorporated New Deal
concepts. 5 Still, that plain vanilla Federalist model has a set of elements
that are widely understood, and widely thought to structure the actions
of our national government.
Theoretically (if somewhat imperfectly in practice), our government
is supposed to function through a series of familiar mechanics: there are
divisions of branches and checks and balances among the branches; there
are equal and uniform laws, operating directly on the people; there is a
popular representation, constructed in such a way that many interests
appear in the representative body and that no one interest can dominate
the others.6
4 Id. at 5-7; cf id. at 30-35 (disagreements and conflicts are in context of larger consensus).
5 See Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 422-25 (1987);
see also Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1052-56,
1069 (1984) (sees New Deal as example of constitutional change).
6 Sunstein, supra note 5, at 430-37 (setting out traditional mechanics of Federalist government).
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One underlying theme of these structural features is the protection
of rights, since the mechanical playing-out of the whole structure works
to impede incursions on individual entitlements. 7 Historically, the right
that was thought to need greatest protection was the right to acquire and
hold property.8 Today, of course, that emphasis on protecting property
engenders much more debate,9 but it is still fair to say that the plain
vanilla model of a constitution, with its attention to individual entitle-
ments, is one that the Marxists might dub bourgeois democratic. Like
most of the other constitutions in the modern western democracies, the
Federalist Constitution has strong connections with entitlements-con-
scious capitalist economic processes.
There are indeed other constitutions, but in our own time, their op-
erations are often explained by reference and comparison to this plain
vanilla model, and critiques of the actual operations of our government
often refer to the plain vanilla model that we are perhaps erroneously
thought to have.10 But when we think back to the time of the adoption of
the Constitution, and to the debates over its ratification, the provincial-
ism of our view comes into relief. The debates of that time show how
mistaken it would be to suppose that the Federalists' Constitution has
always represented the basic model of a constitution, on which all others
are more or less mere variants. Years before we adopted our plain va-
7 See id. at 433-37 (pointing out relationship between traditional constitutional structure and
protection of rights, including private property).
8 See id.; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison); cf Sunstein, supra note 5, at 439-40,
443 (contrasting Madisonian association of separation of powers and protection of property, with
New Deal rejection both of separation of powers and property rights); id. at 452 (summarizing
modem criticism of New Deal's abandonment of separation of powers).
9 One signal of this point is the heated controversy raised by Richard Epstein's book TAKINGS:
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985), which attempts to place prop-
erty in the position of a centrally located constitutional right, and argues against a trend of the last
several decades that has downgraded property and economic rights and has focused on political
rights such as voting, speech and assembly, as well as religion and equal treatment. For some of the
quite sharp criticisms of Epstein's book, see Grey, The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 21 (1986); Kelman, Taking Takings Seriously: An Essay for Centrists, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1829
(1986); Sax, Takings, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 279 (1986); see also Proceedings of the Conference on
Takings of Property and the Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 49 (1986). More sympathetic is
Merrill, Rent Seeking and the Compensation Principle, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 1561 (1986).
10 For example, Cass Sunstein and Bruce Ackerman both compare the post-New Deal constitu-
tionalism to what I am calling the "plain vanilla" model, arguing that the New Deal effected a de
facto constitutional change of great magnitude, and that the federal Constitution isn't plain vanilla
any more. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 437-43; Ackerman, supra note 5, at 1053-55. Sunstein,
however, would like to reform the New Deal model by reinstating some major elements of the plain
vanilla model. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 5, at 483 (New Deal critique of three-part government
"far too crude"; checks and balances can assist accountability). Some authors also compare state or
local governmental structures to the larger federal Constitution's plain vanilla checks-and-balances,
extended representation and so on. See, ag., D. MANDELKER & D. NETSCH, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 8-9 (1983) (comparing state constitutional powers to fed-
eral); see also Waggoner, supra note 2, at 42-43; Note, supra note 2, at 1597-99 (comparing local
governmental structure unfavorably to national).
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nilla model, there was a very different vision of constitutionalism, a vi-
sion captured in the phrase of J.G.A. Pocock in his justly famous book,
The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law.1 Indeed, it is difficult to
see what our plain vanilla version was all about unless we note its sharp
break from this older version of constitutionalism, the "ancient
constitution."
Constitutionalism on the model of the ancient constitution was a
vision of fundamental law deriving from longstanding ways of doing
things, justified either by the sheer antiquity of practice, 12 or by the wis-
dom and suitableness that antiquity signifies. 13 While Pocock himself
has concentrated on the "republican" tradition in the British version of
the ancient constitution, he describes a mentality that was not confined
to Britain. In a broader European context, the idea of an ancient consti-
tution encompassed all kinds of long-established laws, charters, practices,
customs, and local privileges-not the least of which might be local eco-
nomic privileges-that were thought to be constitutive of a given polit-
ical realm, whether republican or not.
The elements of ancient constitutionalism, in this broader sense,
were thus those ways of doing things that were so well-established as to
count as the "nature" of a given polity. Indeed, a constitution on this
older model has close connections with the medieval and early modem
vision of a "body politic": just as one's personal physical makeup is one's
''constitution," so a political constitution was seen as the way that the
body politic was made up-the set of established practices that gave
identity to that body politic. 14
Some echo of this usage survives in the way that the British talk
about the "English Constitution." But in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, it was commonplace all over Europe-and in the English colo-
nies as wel115-that political life was organized about longstanding "con-
11 J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW (2d ed. 1987). For
generalized usage of the term "ancient constitution," see, eg., remarks of the Scottish Enlightenment
thinker James Steuart, quoted in text at note 29, infra.
12 Ia at 17-20 (European political conceptions, sixteenth through eighteenth centuries), 47-49
(Coke and seventeenth century British "ancient constitutional" thought).
13 Id at 171-73 (discussing Hale's anticipation of Burke's arguments of traditional wisdom).
14 C. MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, ANCIENT AND MODERN 27 (1947) (comparison of pol-
ity to body); see also J. ALLEN, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY
196 (rev. ed. 1960) (quoting T. HOOKER, LAWS OF ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY (1594) (the king to-
gether with Parliament "is even the body of the whole realm")); cf id. at 248 (quoting T. ELYOT,
THE GOVERNOUR (1531) ("The public weal... is a body living, compact or made up of sundry
estates and degrees of men, which is disposed by the order of equity and governed by the rule and
moderation of reason." Allen makes the point that Elyot did not think that the form of government
was the most important element in the body politic). McIlwain locates the first use of "constitution"
as an overall frame of government in a document dating from 1610, though he notes other terms for
this concept dating back to the Greek usage of "politeia" as the "'soul' of the polis." C. MCIL-
WAIN, supra, at 25-27.
15 See J. GREENE, PERIPHERIES AND CENTER: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE EX-
84:74 (1989)
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stitutions" or "fundamental laws." 16 It was well understood that these
fundamental laws and constitutions might take different names and de-
scribe quite different governmental institutions; as one eighteenth century
German jurist remarked, "England must be governed according to the
English [constitution], Sweden according to the Swedish, Poland accord-
ing to the Polish, Germany according to the German and also Wuert-
temberg according to Wuerttemberg's own ancient constitution."1 7 As a
matter of fact, Wuerttembergers referred to their ancient constitution as
the "good old law."1 8
Somewhat later, Tocqueville used a different term-"aristocratic"-
to describe this particularistic mode of perceiving political life, and he
spoke of the aristocratic mind-set that continued, albeit in a decaying
form, into the eighteenth century France of "Old Regime." 19 Toc-
TENDED POLITIES OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND THE UNITED STATES, 1607-1788, at 35-42 (1986)
(early eighteenth century American arguments that colonial political practices were based on char-
ters declaring ancient rights and on custom, not to be altered at pleasure of crown; issue was central
to conflicts between crown and colonies).
16 The leading eighteenth century English proponent of this version of constitutionalism was
undoubtedly Edmund Burke. Though his best-known exposition was in his REFLECTIONS ON THE
REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 108-11 (Dolphin ed. 1961) (1790) (treats laws as "inheritance" and society
as intergenerational contract), he had expressed similar views earlier, arguing against Parliamentary
reform in 1782, for example, on the ground that "[o]ur constitution is a prescriptive constitution, it
is a constitution whose whole authority is that it has existed time out of mind." J.G.A. POCOCK,
THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION, supra note 11, at 380 (quoting Burke). For continental visions of
"fundamental law," see C. BEHRENS, THE ANCIENT REGIME 96-98, 102 (1967). See also F. FORD,
ROBE AND SWORD 232 (1953) (eighteenth century France--both royalist and aristocratic constitu-
tional theory revolved around antiquity of practice). The chief 18th century French theorist of the
fundamental law or ancient constitution was Montesquieu, though he borrowed from predecessors.
See F. FORD, supra, at 238-43. The tradition of fundamental law was strong in French political
thought, despite the reputation of the French for "absolutist" monarchic theory. See J. ALLEN,
supra note 14, at 283, 416-17 (16th century royalist theorists agreed that king is bound by fundamen-
tal law); see also Van Gelderen, The Position of the States in the Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt
1555-1581, 7 PARLIAMENTS, ESTATES AND REPRESENTATION 163, 168, 175 (1987) (Dutch theorists
at time of revolt from Spain argued that king was bound by ancient rights and privileges, and funda-
mental laws of provinces).
17 Letter of J.J. Moser to Duke Karl Eugen of Wuerttemberg (1765) ("nach dessen ... al-
thergebrachter Verfassung"), reprinted in R. RUERUP, JOHANN JACOB MOSER, PIETISMUS UND RE-
FORM 245, 246 (1965).
18 H. Lehmann, Die wuerttemberischen Landstaende im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert, in STAENDIS-
CHE VERTRETUNGEN IN EUROPA IM 17. UND 18. JAHRHUNDERT 183 (D. Gerhard ed. 1969); see
also M. WALKER, JOHANN JAKOB MOSER AND THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE OF THE GERMAN NA-
TION 189 (1981). A chief feature of the "old law" was the continued existence of a representative
body of the "estates," who in turn regarded themselves as guardians of existing political, ecclesiasti-
cal and legal relations. H. Lehmann, supra, at 202-03.
19 Tocqueville used the aristocratic designation not so much in the sense of hierarchy as in' the
sense of particularism, in contradistinction from the leveling or "democratic" qualities he found in
America. See, e.g., 2 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 173 (P. Bradley ed. 1945)
("Among an aristocratic people each caste has its own opinions, feelings, rights, customs, and modes
of living"). He saw this aristocratic world as decaying, but to some degree still intact in 18th century
France. See A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, THE OLD REGIME AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 57-60 (S.
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queville's sense of "aristocratic" was a concept of privilege that is now
somewhat strange to us, but was much more familiar in the eighteenth
century. In this older conception, as one modem commentator has ex-
plained, "privilege" did indeed include hierarchy, but need not have sug-
gested (as it usually does today) an unjustifiable special favor to some
groups over others. The concept was rather a larger one, denoting the
way that a multiform society was organized into distinct elements, all of
which were "constituted bodies" with their own privileges.20 Hence, an
actual aristocracy, the nobility, represented only a subset within a multi-
plicity of privileged corporate groups and bodies, in a society in which
"privilege was an integral part of the social order. '21
In practice, then, a dizzying array of particularistic privileges, en-
joyed by localities and groups in their corporate capacity, comprised the
ancient constitution. One Frenchman described the nature of the eight-
eenth century French political scene this way: "Imagine a country where
there are a great many corporate bodies. The result is that ... one hears
talk of nothing but rights, concessions, immunities, special agreements,
privileges, prerogatives. Every town, every community, every province,
every ecclesiastical or judicial body, has its interest to defend in this con-
fusion."' 22 Even though the contents of this sort of constitutionalism va-
ried from place to place, the historian Robert R. Palmer has noted that,
prior to the French Revolution, political observers saw the Atlantic polit-
ical culture as being all of a piece, and they were perfectly comfortable
comparing the institutions of Poland and Virginia, Venice and Geneva,
Belgium and Hungary, Ireland and the provinces of France.23
There is no question, however, that the political culture of the an-
cient constitution had a sharply different set of characteristics from our
plain vanilla version of a constitution. In the first place, ancient constitu-
tionalism was distinctly not a political vision of impartiality or equality
under uniform law. Rather, it recognized the special and particularized
customary privileges of provinces, guilds, municipalities, families, ecclesi-
astical groups, nobles of varying gradations, assemblies of estates, and on
and on, all these elements enjoying some measure of "co-governing"
power with whatever purported to be the central authority. 24
Nor, in the second place, did this version of constitutionalism have
Gilbert trans. 1955) (Part II, ch. 5 "How the idea of centralized administration was established
among the ancient powers, which it supplanted, without, however, destroying them").
20 See C. BEHRENS, supra note 16, at 46, 52-53. For an excellent description of this idea of
aristocratic societies organized about the principle of the distinctive privileges of "constituted bod-
ies," see I R. PALMER, THE AGE OF THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION 27-30 (1959).
21 See C. BEHRENS, supra note 16, at 59-60.
22 Id. at 179 (quoting Rabaut Saint-Etienne).
23 1 R. PALMER, supra note 20, at 27 (citing Edmund Burke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Prince
Kaunitz of Austria).
24 See D. GERHARD, PROBLEMS OF REPRESENTATION AND DELEGATION IN THE EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY 117, 123, in LIBER MEMORIALIS SIR MAURICE POWICKE (1965).
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anything to do with free enterprise and equal rights to develop property.
Every ancient constitution was packed with economic privileges that
were treated as proprietary and sometimes inheritable rights-including
exclusive rights to manufacture and sell particular goods, or to conduct
markets in particular places, or even to hold certain offices of state, along
with their accompanying annuities, fees, and perquisites. 25
Nor, finally, did the ancient constitutions have any truck with a con-
cept of unified government acting directly on the subjects. Everywhere
in Europe, partisans of the ancient constitution fought tooth and nail
against any centralizing efforts of monarchs, efforts that might have re-
moved their particularized privileges and authority.
Indeed, in the eighteenth century, it was the monarchs who bor-
rowed "enlightened" thinkers' ideas of economic and political reform, 26
and who wanted to oust guild privileges and market monopolies and
open up economic enterprise and commerce;27 it was the monarchs, if
anyone, who wanted to abate aristocratic authority in the countryside
and shift power away from local oligarchies in the towns.28 In a remark-
able passage, James Steuart, one of the thinkers associated with the eight-
25 See M. WALKER, GERMAN HOME TOWNS: COMMUNITY, STATE AND GENERAL ESTATE
1648-1871, at 77-78 (1971) (17th-18th century German town guilds' continuing legal monopoly over
specified economic interests within specified territories); see also F. FORD, supra note 16, at 105
(almost all members of French sovereign courts held office as "negotiable property"); J. PLUMB,
THE GROWTH OF POLITICAL STABILITY IN ENGLAND 1685-1725, at 126 (1967) (describing sale of
military office in 17th-18th century Britain); H. ROSENBERG, BUREAUCRACY, ARISTOCRACY AND
AUTOCRACY: THE PRUSSIAN EXPERIENCE 1660-1815, at 80 (1958) (describes family monopolies
over state-run Prussian industries, notably mining and metallurgy).
26 This was especially true on the Continent. In Britain, centralization of authority fell increas-
ingly to the monarchs' advisers who could control Parliament through patronage; the minister who
established this "system" in the early eighteenth century was Robert Walpole, whose corruption was
eschewed by "republicans" as a subversion of the "ancient constitution." See J. PLUMB, supra note
25, at 156-59, 179-80. The association of corruption with monarchist centralization was not lost on
"republicans" in the American colonies. See B. BAILYN, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLrTICS 52-
54 (1967); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 33-34 (1969).
27 See, e.g., J. GAGLIARDO, ENLIGHTENED DESPOTISM 37 (1967) (monarchs in German states,
Tuscany, Spain, Austria, and Sweden attempted to limit guild monopolies and open up opportunities
for nonguild manufacturers); L. KRIEGER, KINGS AND PHILOSOPHERS, 1689-1789, at 132-35 (1970)
(monarchs on the continent as well as in Britain attempted to liberalize commerce and industry).
28 J. GAGLIARDO, supra note 27, at 24 (Austrian efforts to limit powers of local nobility, town
patriciates); L. KRIEGER, supra note 27, at 135 (other monarchs). Austria's Joseph II was perhaps
the most extreme of the "enlightened despots" in his efforts to centralize and rationalize government;
Frederick II of Prussia and Catherine the Great of Russia, though they are often cited as premier
examples of enlightened despots, in fact made considerable concessions to the nobility. See J. GAG-
LIARDO, supra note 27, at 27-29; L. KRIEGER, supra note 27, at 298-300; H. ROSENBERG, supra note
25, at 156-65. Centralization was compatible with the continuation of a nobility, however, so long as
the nobility was kept subservient to the crown. This had been the tactic of Louis XIV-that is,
neutralizing the aristocratic local power base by keeping the nobility at Versailles-and it was this
tactic that Montesquieu found most disturbing. See I MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS
141-42 (Legal Classics Library reprint of 1751 English trans. 1984); see also F. FORD, supra note 16,
at 15-16.
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eenth century Scottish Enlightenment, summed up these developments
and illustrated their interrelationships: "Trade and industry owed their
establishment to the ambition of princes, who supported... the plan...
principally with a view to enrich themselves, and thereby to become for-
midable to their neighbours." But, Steuart went on, this plan also
strengthened commercial enterprisers who had an interest in greater lib-
erty, and this in turn induced princes to "introduc[e] ... a more mild and
more regular plan of administration," which entailed "limiting the power
of the higher classes," and "restrain[ing] the great lords." 'Although it
might appear that these centralizing efforts were designed to make all
power "depend on the prince's will only," Steuart wrote, and "although
the prerogative of some princes ... increased considerably beyond the
bounds of the ancient constitution, even to such a degree as perhaps
justly to deserve the name of usurpation; yet the consequences cannot
every where be said, upon the whole, to have impaired what I call public
liberty." 29
Arthur Young, a later eighteenth century British political essayist
who quoted Steuart's comments, disagreed vehemently with Steuart's op-
timism. In his own work, he interspersed the quotations above with acid
side comments on monarchist overreaching.30 As Steuart had suggested,
however, the monarchs had their own reasons for liberalization and cen-
tralization, notably their effort to solve the pandemic fiscal crises that
accompanied the lack of central control. It was typically the particular-
istic, oligarchic, and "privileged" elements-much more than the more
or less liberal literati like Young-who opposed these monarchist efforts,
and who pounded for the "good old law," even to the point of rebellion
against their kings.
From the later sixteenth century until the French Revolution, anti-
royalist rebellions occurred frequently in the Europe of the ancient con-
stitution. We Americans don't pay much attention to these things, but
our own Revolution was in some ways just another in a long line of
revolts of provincial privilege against centralizing royalist pretensions.31
Sometimes religious differences sharpened these rebellions, but, at root,
they always rested on provincial disgruntlement as monarchs attempted
to undermine local privileges, or to subordinate them to a centralizing
and uniform administration.
We now pay little attention to the revolt of the Netherlands from
29 1 J. STEUART, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 248 (1767),
quoted in A. YOUNG, POLITICAL ESSAYS CONCERNING THE PRESENT STATE OF THE BRITISH EM-
PIRE 71-72 (1970 ed.) (1772).
30 A. YOUNG, supra note 29, at 71-72.
31 See J. GREENE, supra note 15, at 41-42 (status of colonial provincial rights, whether as En-
glishmen or according to local custom, central in issues of American assemblies' political status in
18th century); see also id. at 84 (colonial claim to exemption from central taxation based on "'long
Usage'" and acknowledged privilege).
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their centralizing Spanish monarchs in the later sixteenth century.32 We
pay even less to the later Catalonian and Portuguese revolts against the
same monarchs-or to the French provincial nobles' revolt after decades
of Richlieu's regimentation-all of which transpired at about the same
time as the mid-seventeenth century English civil war.33 As to the Eng-
lish civil war, we forget, if we ever knew about it, that the event that set
off the calling of the Long Parliament, and led to the eventual beheading
of Charles I, was the rebellion of the Scots against what they thought
were royal violations of their provincial privileges, notably their distinc-
tive ecclesiastical organization. 34 We forget too that in the late eight-
eenth century, the French revolution erupted only after decades of
squabbles between the French monarchs and their own privileged
classes.35 We really don't pay attention to the point that in the 1780s,
when the "Enlightened" Austrian Emperor Joseph II (who supposedly
thought that even Mozart's music had too many notes) attempted to sup-
press fiscal and guild privileges of his many provinces in favor of simpli-
fied and uniform imperial laws, his Belgian provinces and their
"constituted bodies" greeted his acts with a sharp resistance-a resist-
ance that gave an example of revolution to their neighbors in France.36
We may forget these things now, but our forefathers who debated
about the 1787 Constitution did not. They were very well aware of these
historic conflicts between centralizing monarchs and longstanding local
privilege, and of the way in which the subversion of "ancient constitu-
tions" might-and indeed ought to-lead to revolution.37
Of late, there has been some dispute whether the Anti-Federalists
might be the American heirs to England's republican "ancient constitu-
tionalists," to the exclusion of their Federalist opponents. 38 On the one
32 See, e.g., Koenigsberger, Why did the States-General of the Netherlands become Revolutionary
in the Sixteenth Century?, in 2 PARLIAMENTS, ESTATES AND REPRESENTATION 103, 108 (1982);
Van Gelderen, supra note 16, at 164 (Dutch revolt against Spain in later 16th century based in part
on dislike of central encroachments on local privileges, also had religious overtones).
33 For a summary of these mid-17th century revolutionary disturbances, see C. FRIEDRICH, THE
AGE OF THE BAROQUE, 1610-1660, at 227-28 (1952) (Catalonia and Portugal); id. at 236-42
(France).
34 2 G. TREVELYAN, HISTORY OF ENGLAND: THE TUDORS AND THE STUART ERA 177 (rev.
ed. 1952); C. WEDGWOOD, THE KING'S PEACE, 1637-41, at 176-78, 196-99 (1955).
35 See J. GAGLIARDO, supra note 27, at 33-34. For the increasingly heated disputes between the
French crown and the "constituted orders," see 1 R. PALMER, supra note 20, at 86-99, 448-65. For
similar conflicts in Sweden and in the various provinces of the Hapsburg Empire, see id. at 99-108.
36 1 R. PALMER, supra note 20, at 34148. The Belgians planted the first tricolor flag in early
1789. Id. at 348. The legendary joke about Joseph's view that Mozart's music had "too many
notes" appears in the play and film "Amadeus."
37 See, e.g., George Mason's reference (Virginia Ratifying Convention) to the flourishing condi-
tion of Holland after its revolt from Spain, in 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 268 (J. Elliot ed. 1881) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, with state of debate in parentheses]; see also remark of Randolph (Virginia), id. at 190,
that the delegates at the convention were "harassed by quotations from Holland and Switzerland."
38 See, e.g., Kramnick, The "Great National Discussion ": The Discourse of Politics in 1787, 45
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hand, in sheer conservatism and insistence on established usages, the
Anti-Federalists undoubtedly paralleled more closely the habits of
thought of ancient constitutionalism than their Federalist opponents.39
On the other hand, Anti-Federalism covered a considerable range of
opinion-some of it overlapping with Federalist views. Anti-Federalists
and Federalists alike cited similar sources and drew from the same rhe-
torical founts. Both sides cited Montesquieu, for example, that well-
known European proponent of the ancient constitution. Both sides also
seemed to eschew the institution of nobility, as Anti-Federalists accused
the Federalists of promoting something like a nobility, while Federalists
more or less denied it.40 Similarly, the Anti-Federalists explicitly aligned
WM. & MARY Q. 3, 12 (1988) [hereinafter Kramnick, The Great National Discussion] (case for
seeing Federalists as Republican theorists along with Anti-Federalists). In an earlier article, Repub-
lican Revisionism Revisited, 87 AM. HIST. Rnv. 629, 634-35 (1982), Kramnick sought to revive the
centrality of Lockeanism to the Anglo-American political debates after 1760, saying that the earlier
concerns of the Republican debate had been "shunted aside" after that time. Kramnick, however,
was discussing radical/reformist thought, primarily from British sources; certainly some of the older
issues such as the standing army and the specter of "placemen" re-surfaced in Anti-Federalist objec-
tions to the Federalist constitution.
The relationship of the constitutional debate to the ancient constitution overlaps with the ques-
tion of the role of "civic republicanism" in American politics, early and recent. This subject is
rapidly acquiring the status of an academic cottage industry; for its influence in legal scholarship, see
the symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988). See also Horwitz, Re-
publicanism and Liberalism in American Constitutional Thought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 57
(1987).
39 See H. Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For, in I THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST
7 (H. Storing ed. 1981) [hereinafter STORING] (Anti-Federalist devotion to status quo, "good old
way," "established usage," rejection of "innovation").
40 See the influential Anti-Federalist "Federal Farmer's" remarks on aristocracy, including "nat-
ural aristocracy," Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican (Dec. 31, 1787), reprinted in 2
STORING, supra note 39, at 266-67. See also speech of George Mason (Virginia), in 3 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 37, at 266-67 (claims that Federal representatives will be "well-born," "that
aristocratic idol.., that exotic plant.., lately imported from ... Great Britain"); for the Federal-
ists, see THE FEDERALIST No. 35 (landowners and merchants likely to be elected, but will attend to
wishes of constituents). Perhaps the most interesting exchange on this subject was that between
Melancton Smith and Alexander Hamilton in the New York ratifying convention, in which Smith
argued that the new constitution would foster a natural aristocracy, and Hamilton replied that an
aristocracy of wealth and talent was inevitable in any scheme of government. See M. Smith, 2
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 37, at 245-48; A. Hamilton, id. at 256.
The American arguments on aristocracy were related to the ancient constitution in a rather
complex fashion. Montesquieu had considered an aristocracy essential in a monarchy, as a mediat-
ing influence, (see 1 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 28, at 18-19) but even Montesquieu thought nobility
inappropriate in a republic. Republican America had rejected monarchy and had never had a nobil-
ity; thus it was perfectly consistent that American ancient constitutionalists would reject a nobility,
even if Montesquieu saw it as appropriate for the French monarchy. See Letters from the Federal
Farmer, (Dec. 31, 1787), 2 STORING, supra note 39, at 267.
All the same, there was always a hierarchical element in any version of the ancient constitution,
including the republican version. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. The Federalists
followed this aristocratic version of republicanism more than the Anti-Federalists, insofar as the
Federalists favored the rule of the best. See Kramnick, The Great National Discussion, supra note
38, at 14.
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themselves with the "republicanism" and "republican virtue" that
marked the American's chosen version of the ancient constitution 4l-but
then, so did their Federalist opponents, at least rhetorically.42
In at least one very important respect, however, the identification
between Anti-Federalism and the ancient constitution did make sense.
That was in the Anti-Federalists' championship of local particularism. 43
They insisted that a national, "consolidated" government would neces-
sarily quell liberty, because a national government would be too large
and its representative bodies too far removed from the people to reflect
their multiform mores and natures. 44 Indeed, even the Anti-Federalist
thumpings about "republican virtue" reflected a conflict between local-
ism and centralism, since corruption was widely regarded as a tool by
which centralizing monarchs and their ministers-notably in Britain-
attempted to overcome the resistance of the virtuous squires of the
"country." 45
The identification between the Anti-Federalists and ancient consti-
tutionalism, then, appears most sharply in their charges, first, that the
Federalist Constitution would institute a consolidated government, and
second, that it smacked of monarchism. Given the circumstances of the
contemporary Atlantic political world, these were in large measure vari-
ants on the same charge. And the Anti-Federalists made this charge for
a very good reason: the Federalist program of a national state did indeed
echo many of the eighteenth century European monarchist projects that
took aim at long-established provincial privileges.
41 See, e.g., M. Smith (New York), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 37, at 250 (Anti-Federal-
ist, extols republicanism).
42 See Kramnick, The Great National Discussion, supra note 38, at 15-16. As to the rhetorical
aspect of the Federalist devotion to republicanism, note the revealing speech of Pendleton (Virginia),
in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 37, at 295-96: after stating that the protection of property was
necessary for "political happiness," he stated that "the true principle of republicanism, and the
greatest security of liberty, is regular government. Perhaps I may not be a republican, but this is my
idea. " (emphasis added). See also A. Hamilton (New York), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 37,
at 257 (true meaning of republicanism is that people can choose whom they wish as governors).
43 For current perspectives, see J. NELSON, LIBERTY AND PROPERTY: POLITICAL ECONOMY
AND POLICYMAKING IN THE NEW NATION, 1789-1812, at 20-21 (1988) (identifies opposition to
Constitution with localist economic interests); Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713
(1988) (notes that modern civic republican revival differs from Anti-Federalist republicanism in fo-
cus on national political scale).
44 See, e.g., G. Mason (Virginia), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 37, at 29-30; see also notes
67-68 and accompanying text infra.
45 See J. PLUMB, supra note 25, at 138, 185-86 (1967) ("Country" party's objections to pa-
tronage and corruption, Walpole's use of these means to centralize authority); see also supra, note 26.
Hamilton noted that the Anti-Federalist fears of corruption related largely to royal corruption of the
House of Commons; see Hamilton (New York), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 37, at 264.
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II. THE FEDERALIST PROJECT: CENTRAL POWER AND ITS
MONARCHIST OVERTONES
The plain vanilla Constitution of the Federalists, like the centraliz-
ing efforts of European monarchs, broke with the older vision of an an-
cient constitution comprised of a multiplicity of "co-governing"
established bodies. The Federalists, like the European monarchs, saw an
overwhelming problem with the ancient constitution: it kept government
weak. Government in such a regime was weak because a polity riddled
by special particularized rights was perpetually beset by fiscal crises46-
and this, of course, was also the perceived opinion about the United
States under the Articles of Confederation.47 But, more generally, gov-
ernance under the ancient constitution was weak because such a multi-
form polity, dependent as it was on those who held particularized
privileges, could gather itself only with the utmost strain and effort to
exercise any concentrated force or influence. Alexander Hamilton's radi-
cal conclusion was that the very notion of a regime dependent on other
political authorities, in their corporate or collective form, was "the bane
of the old [constitution] and.., in itself evidently incompatible with the
idea of GOVERNMENT. '4
Hamilton looked to Europe for this assertion, quite as much as to
the United States of the Articles of Confederation. In two of The Feder-
alist papers that have been rather neglected, Numbers 19 and 20,4 9 Ham-
ilton and Madison excoriated precisely the type of regime that appeared
throughout Europe before the French Revolution. One can see their
viewpoint most clearly in their scathing remarks on the fragmented poli-
tics of the Dutch and the Swiss republics-which the Anti-Federalists
often cited as models of confederate republics-50-and even more in their
attitude toward the Germans' "Holy Roman Empire," which, as Voltaire
had wisecracked, was "neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire."51 In-
deed, by the later eighteenth century, the old Empire had shattered into
46 See, eg., C. BEHRENS, supra note 16, at 116-17 (even European "absolute" monarchs unable
to overcome fiscal and administrative problems that accompanied multiplicity of local privileges).
47 See, eg., remarks of Rufus King (Massachusetts), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 37, at
55-56 (comparing inability of provincially fragmented 17th century Netherlands to U.S. inability to
raise money for defense); see also F. McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 170-72 (1985) (United States' fiscal problems under Articles attrib-
uted to divisions among states, particularist attitudes); G. WOOD, supra note 26, at 466.
48 THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 108 (A. Hamilton) (Rossiter ed. 1961) [page references hereinaf-
ter to this edition].
49 These papers, for example, are not included in Clinton Rossiter's listing of the 21 papers
considered the "cream" by "common consent of learned opinion." THE FEDERALIST xvii.
50 See, eg., Henry (Virginia), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 37, at 142-43 (Switzerland),
145-47 (Holland); see also supra note 37 (complaints in Virginia ratifying convention about refer-
ences to Holland and Switzerland).
51 J. GAGLIARDO, REICH AND NATION: THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE AS IDEA AND REALITY,
1763-1806, at 291 (1980)quoting VOLTAIRE, ESSAI SUR LES MOEURS ET L'ESPRrr DES NATIONS 70
(1769) ("ni saint, ni romain," ni empire").
84:74 (1989)
HeinOnline -- 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 85 1989-1990
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
hundreds of semi-sovereign entities, and it undoubtedly represented the
most striking efflorescence of the ancient constitutional style of govern-
ance. 52 The Federalist No. 19 treated the Empire as the quintessential
horrible example of the polity that exists in a "community of sover-
eigns," and its discussion of this "nerveless body" displays Publius' po-
lemical style at its most savage. Upbraiding the Empire for its "general
imbecility, confusion and misery," the Federalist followed with a litany
of its subjection to external invasions, internal intrigues, overweening
strong men and oppressed weak ones, atrocious administration, and bun-
gled enforcement. 53
How could this weakness be overcome? The Federalists had a pro-
gram, and, like the contemporary monarchic plans, theirs entailed a
sharp break from ancient constitutionalism altogether. The first compo-
nent of their program flowed from a Hamiltonian rejection of depen-
dence on other political bodies. The new constitution would set out a
large, unified government whose laws and taxes would fall directly upon
the citizenry. This government would reject the mediation of any other
governmental bodies in their corporate form-all those in-between states
and provinces and other local bodies, those "pourvoirs intermeditaires"
of which Montesquieu spoke approvingly in large-scale monarchy, but
which many Continental monarchs had at least half-heartedly attempted
to supplant long before the Federalist's constitutional foray.54
The second component in the Federalist program also rang a famil-
iar monarchic note, at least among the monarchs of an Enlightened
stripe: the new government would promote commerce.5 5 Commerce, as
52 J. GAGLIARDO, supra note 51, at 4-5 (Empire had over 1800 territories as member states,
varying greatly in size); see also Rose, Empire and Territories at the End of the Old Reich, in J. VANN
& S. ROWAN, THE OLD REICH: ESSAYS ON GERMAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, 1495-1806, at 61,
62-63 (1975) (fragmentation continued to sub-territorial level, had constitutional basis).
53 THE FEDERALIST No. 19, at 130-31 (J. Madison).
54 See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. See also F. FORD, supra note 16, at 239; 1
MONTESQUIEU, supra note 28, at 18-19. Tocqueville's theme in THE OLD REGIME AND THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION was that the Revolution only carried to a logical extreme the earlier royal
efforts to banish intermediating powers. See OLD REGIME, supra note 19, at 19-20, 32. For the
Federalist program of legislation acting directly on the people, see Hamilton in THE FEDERALIST
No. 15 (inconsistent with idea of government to depend on intermediating states) and No. 16 (na-
tional government must act directly on individuals). In the Constitutional ratifying period, much of
the debate over direct federal authority over the citizenry concerned taxation. See, e.g., remarks of
Gore (Massachusetts), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 37, at 66-67 (defense requires national
government to be able to tax citizens directly); Madison (Virginia), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra
note 37, at 250-51 (same); cf opponents: Lansing (New York), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note
37, at 373-74 (state taxes with requisitions to national government preferable since state legislatures
better acquainted with citizens).
55 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 12, at 92 (A. Hamilton) ("The prosperity of commerce is now
perceived and acknowledged by all enlightened statesmen to be the most useful as well as the most
productive source of national wealth, and has accordingly become a primary object of their political
cares."). Note the similarity of Hamilton's views to those of James Steuart. See J. STEUART, supra
note 29.
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Publius observed, would produce wealth, and wealth would make the
nation powerful.5 6 And what did commerce entail? Quite apart from the
enlarged markets with free exchange that would be guaranteed by the
commerce clause, commerce itself entailed individual rights, and espe-
cially the rights of property. If everyone were secure in his property,
everyone would invest time and effort in that property, and make the
property even more valuable. And in turn, this would have positive con-
sequences for the nation's wealth and strength.57
Quite a bit earlier, John Locke had pointed out the relationship be-
tween security of property and national force. As he had put it, the
"wise and godlike" prince who "by established laws of liberty ... se-
cure[s] protection and incouragement to the honest industry of Mankind
against the oppression of power and narrownesse of Party will quickly be
too hard for his neighbours. ' ' 58 Somewhat later, the Physiocrats on the
Continent had noted the connection between private property and na-
tional power, and had encouraged European monarchs to secure private
property and remove restraints on exchange, so that the fruits of individ-
ual enterprise could flow unimpeded through the nation and make the
whole wealthier. Many monarchs and their advisers had heard the
message, and had liberalized commerce and promoted the factory indus-
try that undermined local restraints on labor practices and markets.5 9
The Federalists heard the message too, perhaps as translated by
Adam Smith.60 In addition to the commerce clause that would national-
ize the market, their Constitution had several elements aimed at securing
a commercial republic from internal threats to private property. One
threat involved what Locke had called "narrownesse of Party," or, in the
Federalist translation, faction-the enthusiasms of partial interest groups
that could erode individual rights and property interests, and in general
disrupt the "honest industry of Mankind." The Federalists' control of
faction dovetailed back to the idea of a unified central government acting
directly on the citizenry, most explicitly stated by Madison in his famous
The Federalist No. 10: in the multiparty representation of the "extended
56 THE FEDERALIST No. 12, at 93, 96 (A. Hamilton) (free commerce enhances revenues, reve-
nues necessary for strength).
57 See Diamond, The Federalist, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, 631, 649-50 (L.
Strauss & J. Cropsey eds. 2d ed. 1972) (authors of The Federalist saw need for protection of property
and large commercial republic, for sake of strength).
58 J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 340 (P. Laslett rev. ed. 1963).
59 See L. KRIEGER, supra note 27, at 131-35 (widespread liberalization of commerce and indus-
try, influence of Physiocrats and other laissez-faire thinkers); see also E. Fox-GENOVESE, THE ORI-
GINS OF PHYSIOCRACY: ECONOMIC REVOLUTION AND SOCIAL ORDER IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
FRANCE 10-11 (1976). The Physiocrats thought that all wealth flowed from agriculture, but other
laissez-faire thinkers of the period, including Adam Smith, extended their views of private property
and free enterprise to manufacture as well. See L. KRIEGER, supra.
60 F. McDONALD, supra note 47, at 128 (Smith's Wealth of Nations created a sensation in
America; Hamilton and Madison used its ideas extensively).
84:74 (1989)
HeinOnline -- 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 87 1989-1990
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
republic," parochial factions would neutralize each other's attempts to
intrude on the rights of property. Moreover, the clause protecting obli-
gations of contracts would halt local or state governments' factional en-
croachments on property rights-encroachments that might otherwise
weaken the nation by sapping the enterprising drive of the citizenry. As
to what Locke called the "oppression of power" at a higher level, any
Federal encroachments would be halted before they began, through
checks and balances among the various governmental institutions.
The protection of commerce and the unification of government thus
aimed at the same goal: the unified commercial republic would be a
stronger political entity than those that were fragmented, through their
"ancient constitutions," into a kaleidoscope of local privileges and special
laws. It would be stronger not just because it was unified politically and
economically, but also because its commercially-minded citizens, secure
in the rights of private property, could safely hustle about their interests
in a way that would make the whole nation richer.
The Federalists' plain vanilla version of constitutionalism, then, was
a logical extension of some of the major European monarchical projects.
It displaced ancient constitutionalism with a new constitutionalism of
uniform laws that directly affected individual citizens. It safeguarded all
in a homogeneous commercial environment of secure property and free
exchange; in this environment, differences in talents could freely arrive at
differences in wealth. The resulting unified, commercial nation would be
a strong and wealthy one, ready for any jealous threats that its own pros-
perity might bring forth.61
At bottom, of course, I am suggesting that considerations of exter-
nal strength-national defense and a credible foreign policy-wagged a
good part of the constitutional dog that the Federalists proposed.62 To
some considerable degree, their constitutional project concentrated on
overcoming the deplorable weakness of the early republic, and by taking
a leaf from Locke's Godlike prince, they hoped to make the republic "too
hard for its neighbors."
61 See Hamilton's discussion of commerce in THE FEDERALIST No. 6 and No. 12. For an inter-
esting recent parallel, see Epstein, Modern Republicanism-Or the Flight from Substance, 97 YALE
L.J. 1633, 1635, 1641-42 (1988) (criticizing republican revival for inattention to unattractive features
of historical republics, including bellicosity and dissipation of "social output.., on aggression and
defense," goes on to argue for firm individual rights).
62 Cf LaFeber, The Constitution and United States Foreign Policy: An Interpretation, 74 J.
AMER. HIST. 695, 695-96 (1987) (founders kept foreign policy considerations clearly in mind, did
not separate those considerations from domestic policy and constitutional issues). This point has
also been stressed in Gerald Stourzh's analytical biography, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE
IDEA OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT 127-30, 142-45 (importance of commerce in modem warfare),
160-61 (importance of unification for strength) (1970). Steven Watts, THE REPUBLIC REBORN:
WAR AND THE MAKING OF LIBERAL AMERICA, 1790-1820, at xvi-xvii, 310-12, 316-20 (1987), ar-
gues that the War of 1812 acted as a catalyst in popularizing this political program of commercial-
ism/liberalism/national strength, and in substituting this political agenda for the earlier classical
republicanism of the eighteenth century.
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I am further suggesting that some key components of the Federal-
ists' plain vanilla constitutional scheme-uniform, large-scale central
government on the one hand, and the promotion of commerce on the
other-were also ideas associated with monarchist projects in Europe.
The European monarchs had not been particularly successful at these
projects, but, as Tocqueville pointed out, it was the French Revolution
that ruthlessly carried forth the monarchist project of leveling local privi-
leges, and Napoleon that became the first monarch of a truly centralized
state.63 The monarchs of the Enlightenment era had set the direction
that the French Revolution and Napoleon later followed-and that the
Anti-Federalists so feared in the United States.
III. THE ANTI-FEDERALIST CRITIQUE
With all this, let me turn back to the Anti-Federalists. The Anti-
Federalists understood very well the Federalist goal of strength-along
with the commercialization and centralization that were designed to pro-
mote that strength. More than any other of the Constitution's oppo-
nents, it was Patrick Henry who hit upon the very nerve of the Federalist
project of external strength. "You are not to inquire how your trade may
be increased," he said, "nor how you are to become a great and powerful
people, but how your liberties can be secured; for liberty ought to be the
direct end of your government."64 It was these "liberties" that the Anti-
Federalists saw threatened by the plan of what they called a consolidated
government, the liberties that guaranteed their ability to rule themselves,
to choose their destiny in a way that had genuine meaning. And it was
concern for these "liberties" that linked the Anti-Federalists with the
ancient constitution of Europe, particularly the republican version of the
ancient constitution.
To begin with the centralizing component of the Federalist project:
the Anti-Federalists thought that an "extended republic" was a misno-
mer, and that any large-scale government would necessarily fall back
63 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, OLD REGIME, supra note 19, at 19-20, 32.
64 P. Henry (Virginia), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 37, at 44. In another passage he
elaborated, in a way that still conveys an idea why his contemporaries thought him such an effective
orator: "Some way or other we must be a great and mighty empire," he sneered,
we must have an army, and a navy, and a number of things. When the American spirit was in
its youth, the language of America was different: liberty, sir, was then the primary object....
But now, sir, the American spirit, assisted by the ropes and chains of consolidation, is about to
convert this country into a powerful and mighty empire.... Such a government is incompatible
with the genius of republicanism.
P. Henry (Virginia), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 37, at 53-54.
The New York Anti-Federalist writer "Brutus" linked the Federalist project to European gov-
ernments' military ambitions: "The European governments are almost all of them framed... with a
view to arms, and war... We ought to furnish the world with an example of a great people, who in
their civil institutions hold chiefly in view, the attainment of virtue, and happiness among ourselves."
Essays of Brutus to the Citizens of New York (Jan. 3, 1788), reprinted in 2 STORING, supra note 39,
at 401.
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into a system that depended on force rather than republican self-rule.
Why was this so? First, there was the authority of Montesquieu, who
had said that even moderately extended areas could only be governed by
monarchy (assisted and tempered by the nobility) and that very large
territories were necessarily despotic. Republics, on the other hand,
which depended on civic participation, were necessarily small.65
When the Federalist tried to skirt Montesquieu by arguing that rep-
resentative institutions made it possible to create a large republic, 66 the
New York Anti-Federalist Melancton Smith countered that even popular
representation would be defective in a large territory. Electoral districts
would of necessity be large, he said, and the constituents of those districts
could not really know their so-called representatives, and vice versa. 67
Thus, the only persons who could get elected in large districts would be
the persons whose wealth and fame would enable them to publicize
themselves-persons quite dissimilar from and unrepresentative of those
for whom they purportedly spoke. The yeoman, the everyday citizen of
the "middling class," would have no chance of election against this "nat-
ural aristocracy." Thus, the supposedly representative body would not
be at all representative of the various elements of the constituency, but
would fall into the hands of a wellborn and influential upper class, which
had no feel for the ordinary citizen's needs and wishes. 68
From all this, the Anti-Federalists thought, it followed that the Fed-
eralist plan necessitated force. These so-called representatives, ignorant
of their constituents' needs, and both literally and psychically distant
from those constituents, would pass laws that were unsuited to the differ-
ent parts of the republic. As a consequence, the execution of their laws
would ultimately depend on force rather than consent.69 In the bleakest
65 1 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 28, at 18-22 (distinguishing monarchies, which had nobility,
from despotism); id. at 150-53 (republics must be in small area; monarchies may be larger; very large
areas require despotism). Patrick Henry seemed to reflect Montesquieu's division of authoritarian
rule into monarchy and despotism, when he remarked that Great Britain was a monarchy-"a com-
pact between prince and people, with checks on the former to secure the liberty of the latter," P.
Henry (Virginia), in 3 ELLIoT's DEBATES, supra note 37, at 44, whereas the Federalists' consoli-
dated government would have no such checks and would be a tyranny. Id. at 59.
66 THE FEDERALIST No. 14, at 100 (J. Madison).
67 M. Smith (New York), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 37, at 245-48. This argument was
made frequently by other Anti-Federalists as well, e.g., P. Henry (Virginia), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,
supra note 37, at 64 (representatives would be "chosen blindfolded.").
68 M. Smith (New York), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 37, at 245-47; see also Letters from
a Federal Farmer (Oct. 10, 1787), in 2 STORING, supra note 39, at 235; Letters of Centinel to the
Freemen of Pennsylvania, in 2 STORING, supra note 39, at 142; and Essays of Brutus (Nov. 15,
1787), in 2 STORING, supra note 39, at 380. Hannah Pitkin, in describing theories of representation,
has described a "picturing" or "mirroring" theory that seems to fit the Anti-Federalist understand-
ing of representation. H. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 60-61 (1967); for an exam-
ple, see Essays of Brutus, supra (representative body should "bear a just resemblance to the several
classes of people who compose it," including farmers, merchants, etc., who should be "represented
according to their respective weight and numbers.").
69 See M. Smith (New York), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 37, at 246-47 (upper-class
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version of this Anti-Federalist view, the Federalists' "extended republic"
would have to depend on a standing army to enforce its laws. Nor would
the states retain the ability to defend their citizens; they would lose con-
trol of their militias, which would in any event be overwhelmed by the
national government's standing army.70 Moreover, to collect the funds
for such an army and for all the other misguided plans of a bloated,
crypto-monarchical national government, a swarm of "bloodsucking"
tax collectors would land like "harpies" on the tyrannized citizenry-at
the same time further emasculating the states, by drying up their revenue
sources. 71 Better, then, and certainly more consistent with Montes-
quieu's description of republican principles, that the nation be a kind of
league of more or less autonomous and truly republican states, in which
representation was a genuine form of self-rule.72
The Anti-Federalists' concern for local autonomy ranged in all dif-
ferent directions, and even included, for example, an argument about
jury trials. In arguing for the right to civil jury trial, they said that legal
rights should be settled by the jury of the vicinage-a jury which would
base its decision on the local knowledge of ordinary people (including
information about the parties) rather than on some uniform, homogene-
ous version of the law. 73 The preservation of local autonomy-and with
it, the meaningful liberty of self-rule-was thus at the center of the Anti-
representatives would neither know nor care about concerns of middling classes and poor); Letters
from a Federal Farmer (Oct. 10, 1787), in 2 STORING, supra note 39, at 234 (laws in new government
would have to be effectuated by force); Letters of Centinel to the Freemen of Pennsylvania, in 2
STORING, supra note 39, at 166-67 (slavery the fate of people in consolidated extensive territory);
Essays of Brutus (Nov. 29, 1787), in 2 STORING at 385.
70 P. Henry (Virginia), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 37, at 59-60, 384-87; see also G.
Mason (Virginia), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 37, at 378-81 (argues for state militias instead
of standing army, sees need for state consent for use of militia out of state); cf. J. Madison (Virginia),
in 3 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 37, at 382 (argues for central control of militia). The arguments
over control of military forces in some ways paralleled the arguments over taxation, with the Feder-
alists wishing for at least some direct national control, while Anti-Federalists argued for state con-
trol of their own militias, with contributions to the national government. Similarly, the Anti-
Federalists wanted taxes to be raised through requisitions from the states. See, eg., Letters from the
Federal Farmer (Oct. 10, 1787), in 2 STORING, supra note 39, at 241-42. For further comments on
taxes, see infra note 71 and accompanying text. For the importance of the militia in traditional
republican arguments, see J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLIT-
ICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 124, 292-93, 527-28 (1975).
71 See P. Henry (Virginia), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 37, at 51 (standing army to
enforce tyrannous laws); id. at 55-56 (tax collectors described as bloodsuckers and harpies, taking
people's property for "splendour" and "extravagance" of national offices). For references to monar-
chic character of the office of the presidency in the consolidated national government, see, eg.,
Letters of Cato to the Citizens of the State of New York, in 2 STORING, supra note 39, at 115-17.
For the effect of direct federal taxation on the states, see, eg., Essays of Brutus (Dec. 13, 1787),
reprinted in 2 STORING, supra note 39, at 391.
72 See M. Smith (New York), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 37, at 224 (citing Montes-
quieu); P. Henry (Virginia), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 37, at 44, 52-53.
73 See, eg., P. Henry (Virginia), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 37, at 578-79; cf Letters
from a Federal Farmer, 2 STORING, supra note 39, at 320 (saw issue more as one of not excluding
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Federalist position; this concern animated their objections to consoli-
dated government.
A more muted part of the Anti-Federalist argument, however, in-
volved a critique of the Federalist approach to property rights. Although
the Anti-Federalists supported the rights of property and even com-
merce, 74 and eschewed the then-recent "leveling" of Shay's Rebellion,75
they rejected the Federalist program of protecting property solely for the
sake of encouraging individual economic efforts in the short run, or na-
tional wealth and power in the long run. They had a different goal in
mind in protecting property: they thought that property was a basis of
republican civic independence. This character-building goal in turn
modified the way that they approached property rights.
Anti-Federalist speeches and writings were shot through with a kind
of ideal type of citizen: the model was the yeoman, the citizen of the
"middling" sort-the respectable, knowledgeable, frugal, and public-
spirited individual, who acts upon deliberation and cooperation with
other citizens of similarly modest means and independence. 76 It was im-
portant to protect property to allow this ideal citizen to maintain the
independence necessary for self-rule. Property, in this view, was only
useful insofar as it helped citizens retain a sturdy manliness, among
others of like character. Some Anti-Federalist writings followed Montes-
quieu in suggesting that gross disparities of wealth were corrupting in a
republic.77 The implication was that property rights should not be so
zealously guarded as to reach this point, since the evil of inequality
common people, who understand oral testimony better and who should be included in all branches
of government).
74 See, eg., Letters from a Federal Farmer (Dec. 25, 1787), in 2 STORING, supra note 39, at 262,
(listing among the fundamental rights in the United States, "The people have a right to hold and
enjoy their property according to known standing laws, and which cannot be taken from them with-
out their consent, or the consent of their representatives .... ). Herbert Storing makes the point
that the Anti-Federalists supported commerce as well, and had no wish to return to primitivism. 1
STORING, supra note 39, at 45-46. On the other hand, recent scholarship has suggested that the
Enlightenment discussion of commerce had presented commerce as a socializing and liberating insti-
tution, and the Anti-Federalists may have had this version of commerce in mind. See A. HIRSCH-
MAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS 59-66 (1977) (commerce a calming and socializing
activity); see also J. APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEw SOCIAL ORDER 31-32, 37, 94-97 (1984)
(capitalism thought to remove necessity of hierarchical ordering; this view associated with Anti-
Federalist/Republican thought). For an interesting example of the mixture of republican and com-
mercial thought in the early 1800s, see the description of John Taylor's writings in S. WATTS, supra
note 62, at 16-28. Taylor, described as a former "lukewarm Anti-Federalist," id. at 18, approved of
commerce and Adam Smith, but railed against "finance capitalism" as an institution that would
undermine Republican equality and morality. Id. at 23-27.
75 Letters from a Federal Farmer (Oct. 13, 1787), in 2 STORING, supra note 39, at 253.
76 See, e.g., M. Smith (New York), in 2 ELLIoT's DEBATES, supra note 37, at 248.
77 Montesquieu's view was that while republics could be commercial, and could withstand ine-
qualities of wealth to a point, equality was the hallmark of democracy, and too great disparities
could undermine the virtues supporting commerce as well as the republic itself. See 1 MONTS-
QUIEU, supra note 28, at 52-57.
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would sap a source of strength quite different from Federalist economic
wealth. That source of strength was civic virtue.
Indeed, the real protection of liberty, the Anti-Federalists thought,
lay not in property rights and commerce as such, but rather in those
institutions that would promote the courage, independence, judgment,
and selflessness of the citizenry. They thought, as the influential "Letters
from the Federal Farmer" put it, that
[i]f there are advantages in the equal division of our lands, and the strong
and manly habits of our people, we ought to establish governments calcu-
lated to give duration to them, and not governments which never can work
naturally, till that equality of property, and those free and manly habits
shall be destroyed. 78
In short, then, the Anti-Federalist view was that the Federalists'
plain vanilla constitutional project-to become a rich and powerful na-
tion-was a case of collective loss of focus on the real objects of republi-
can government. In order to arrive at a powerful state, we would have to
have at the outset a centralized government that smacked of the worst
versions of monarchism. A centralized government, in turn, would de-
stroy effective liberty and self-rule, which was necessarily local. Finally,
this government might so relentlessly protect a regime of property and
commerce-along with the "natural aristocracy" that would dominate
the regime economically and politically-as to bring about the debase-
ment of the best citizenry. 79
Still another point was only hinted at by Anti-Federalists, but it
loomed larger in later years: that the Federalist project of wealth and
power might carry corruptions greater than our own citizenry. As the
Anti-Federalist "Brutus" commented, the new United States should
structure itself to give the world an example of virtue and happiness, and
not follow the European governments that were "framed" for armaments
and war.80
Though they could not know it at the time, the true culmination of
Anti-Federalist fears-and Tocqueville's specter later-was Napoleon's
Empire. Here was the politically centralized regime, built up after the
revolutionary leveling of local "liberties," now with a single, uniform na-
tional administration. Here was the economic regime of property rights,
now established through a legal system that protected the acquisitions
and commercial pursuits of the citizens. 81 And here was the ruthless
dictatorship that stood squarely on military force and a standing army,
and that could terrorize the citizenry at home as well as the neighboring
states.
78 Letters from a Federal Farmer (Oct. 13, 1787), in 2 STORING, supra note 39, at 251.
79 See M. Smith (New York), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 37, at 250-51.
80 Essays of Brutus, in 2 STORING, supra note 39, at 401, quoted supra note 64.
81 See E. Fox-GENOVESE, supra note 59, at 312 (aside from influence of peasantry, sees eco-
nomic individualism of Revolution and Napoleonic Empire as "physiocracy triumphant").
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IV. ANTI-FEDERALIST ECHOES OF LOCALISM AND REPUBLICANISM
Everyone knows that the Anti-Federalists lost, and they may have
lost precisely because they could not come up with a credible alternative
to the Federalist program for national strength.8 2 Even in the early years
of the Republic, their localist position faded from view in the great na-
tional debates. 83 But did they lose entirely? Or did they retain some
influence on American political life-and if they did, why did they and
where was that influence located? And is it perhaps just another version
of that same question to ask, why has the Federalist attack on the ancient
constitution produced no American Napoleon?
A. The Echoes of a Distinctively Local Practice
Those seeking a continuing Anti-Federalist presence might well lo-
cate that presence in "states' rights," in its various historical permuta-
tions. 84 While states' rights proponents unquestionably borrowed
republican rhetoric,8 5 the equation with states' rights misidentifies the
most influential aspects of the Anti-Federalist legacy. It is a misidentifi-
cation of an interesting sort, though, because in linking later states' rights
arguments to Anti-Federalism, the argument replicates a major difficulty
in the Anti-Federalists' own position.
The Anti-Federalists spoke fervently and often for the continuing
autonomy of the states. But as Hamilton quite trenchantly pointed out,
the states were themselves too large for the kind of republicanism that
the Anti-Federalists seemed to have in mind.86 Their version of republi-
canism, with its self-rule and civic participation, is only possible at a level
more localized than the states. And this is why the association of Anti-
Federalism with states' rights is relatively sterile ground if we are looking
for the lasting contribution of Anti-Federalist ideas. Instead, we have to
look to local political organizations to seek the continuing influence of
the Anti-Federalist attitude, and indeed the continuing influence of the
ancient constitution.
Let me begin with a first distinctive characteristic of local govern-
82 See, e.g., 1 STORING, supra note 39, at 42-43 (though generally sympathetic to Anti-Federal-
ists, thought they never answered Federalist arguments for effective government).
83 See J. NELSON, supra note 43, at 20-21 (debates of the 1780s centered on dispute between
nationalists and localists, but thereafter political issues on national level were within a nationalist
consensus); see also S. WArTs, supra note 62 (liberal capitalist position supplanted classic republi-
canism by end of War of 1812).
84 See, e.g., Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1452 (1987).
85 See, e.g., L. FORD, JR., ORIGINS OF SOUTHERN RADICALISM. THE SOUTH CAROLINA UP-
COUNTRY, 1800-1860, at 49-52, 68 (1988) (describing upcountry South Carolina neighbors and
friends of John C. Calhoun as having ideology of "country republicanism," stressing independence
and productive property).
86 THE FEDERALIST No. 9, at 73 (A. Hamilton) (states already larger than republic size recom-
mended by Montesquieu); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 355 (J. Madison) (some state electo-
ral districts as large as national).
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ments-a characteristic that raises great chagrin among some commenta-
tors. Local governments have had a quite distinctive attitude about
private property rights.87 Land use controls are one of the major areas in
which local governments currently exercise authority, and a great
number of land use decisions have to do with one-on-one disputes among
neighbors about the appropriate level of development. Entitlements in
these areas are notoriously fuzzy, and when local boards do spell them
out, they lean toward the maintenance of the status quo. Even formal-
ized zoning restraints often prove quite malleable in fact; actual decisions
relate less to some formal structure of entitlements than to discussions,
negotiations, and "venting" based on community understanding of ap-
propriate behavior.s8 As between neighbors, local institutions play less
the role of the protector of entitlements, and more the role of ad hoc
mediators. These same local institutions, however, are apt to make con-
siderably higher demands on outsiders and innovators than they do on
established uses.89 In short, in these very important aspects of local gov-
ernment, political bodies are not much engaged as Federalist-style impar-
tial guardians of entitlements or protectors of investment and commerce.
If anything, they are more the guardians of the ancient constitution, in
the sense of a web of community understandings-sometimes highly idi-
osyncratic-about the way things ought to be done.90
If local governments have their own views about rights, and most
notably about the rights of property, what then serves as the brake on
87 See, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 265 (local intrusions on private property); Kmiec,
Deregulating Land Use." An Alternative Free Enterprise Development System, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 28,
4043 (1981) (complains about cavalier and uncontrolled local regulations affecting property); see
also Kmiec, The Role of the Planner in a Deregulated World, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., June
1982, at 4 (same).
88 See Rose, New Models for Local Land Use Decisions, 79 Nw. U.L. REv. 1155, 1168-70 (1984-
85), and authorities cited therein.
89 Id. (local decisionmakers mediate between neighbors). For higher demands on outsiders, see
the great array of growth control and subdivision exaction cases, e.g. Associated Home Builders of
the Greater E. Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630
(1971); Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138
(1972). See generally F. JAMES & D. GALE, ZONING FOR SALE 31-34 (1977) (describing new exac-
tion devices as unequal "tax" on new residents and businesses); Ellickson, Suburban Growth Con-
trols: An Economic and LegalAnalysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 430-35 (1977) (describing growth controls
as insiders' "cartel"). The most recent example may be the so-called "linkage" programs, whereby
new developments are asked to contribute to transportation systems, public works, or neighborhood
development elsewhere in a city. Such schemes may be limited by the recent Supreme Court case
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n., 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987) (development exactions must be re-
lated to burdens imposed by development itself).
90 For the connection between local decisionmaking and the Anti-Federalist tradition, see Rose,
Planning and Dealing, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 837, 882-87 (1983). For some very interesting observa-
tions on the ways in which community understanding supersede formal law, see Ellickson, Of Coase
and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REv. 623, 668-76,
679-80 (1986) (local residents ignore formal law; public officials more or less accommodate local
understanding).
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their oppressiveness? What, if anything, prevents local majorities from
ganging up to wrest away the fruits of honest industry, particularly from
out-group minorities?91 There are, of course, the widely-discussed fed-
eral and state constitutional strictures against "takings" of property,92
but I want to leave those to one side in this discussion.
An answer that could come straight from the civic republican tradi-
tion is virtue-and this presents a second difference between local govern-
ments and centralized ones. No one, of course, is naive enough to
suggest that local government is necessarily more virtuous than central
government; the usual suggestion is just the reverse.93 But I would sug-
gest that local government is the location where virtue and its opposite,
corruption, are most discussed as political issues.94 This is because, at
the local level, we have to rely more on the virtue of the participants; and
as a consequence, we talk more about their rectitude or corruption.
But (no doubt fortunately) virtue is not the only safeguard against
local oppression. Again, leaving to one side the Constitutional limita-
tions on takings of property, still other restraints inhibit local overreach-
ing, which brings me to a third difference between local governments and
governments on a larger scale. Local governments are quite differently
organized from the federal or even the state governments, and, among
other things, have far fewer of the mechanics of checks and balances, and
far less multiple-interest representation, than do larger governments.
But it is at least arguable that, in local governments, the absence of these
structural restraints is counterbalanced by the possibilities for constituent
contact and civic participation-what Albert Hirschman calls the
"voice" option. 95
I think there is much territory to be explored in connection with the
forms of local civic voice. For one example, some cities are themselves
rather large for the personal participation of individuals, and it may be
important to think about sub-political bodies, such as neighborhood or-
ganizations and other civic groups, as the locus for "republican" associa-
91 For fears of this sort, see Waggoner, supra note 2, at 43; Note, supra note 2, at 1598-99 (local
governments' structure may permit oppression of minorities).
92 Richard Epstein's TAKINGS, supra note 9, is a recent foray, but almost every property teacher
takes a shot at this elusive subject. For some of this literature, including my own shot, see Rose,
Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 561, 562 n.5
(1984).
93 See, eg., NATIONAL INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CORRUPTION IN
LAND USE AND BUILDING REGULATION (1979).
94 This has also been true historically. Consider, for example, the discussion of big city corrup-
tion beginning in the later 19th century. See, e.g., THE CITY BOSS IN AMERICA: AN INTERPRETA-
TIVE READER (A. Callow ed. 1976); GRIFFITH, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CITY GOVERNMENT:
THE CONSPICUOUS FAILURE, 1870-1900, at 97 (2d ed. 1972) (chapter entitled The Cancer of
Corruption).
95 See A. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY (1970). A recent spokesman for the view of
city government as a locus of associational, participatory self-determination is Gerald Frug, in his
article The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1087 (1980).
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tional voice. For another and related example, some scholars may be
thinking too much about local participation in the form of voting, and
not enough about other forms of participation. 96 Indeed, voting may
well be a relatively minor aspect of local civic participation. Other ver-
sions of voice may be much more important locally: the informal constit-
uent contacts, the PTA meetings, the civic groups' banging on the door
at city hall, the cub reporters' scandal-mongering, the highly issue-ori-
ented jawboning that is the very stuff of local controversy.97
Yet another and quite different safeguard on local government
brings me to a fourth difference between local and central governments.
This is the safeguard, to use Hirschman's terminology again, that we
might call "exit" 98-the ability to abandon something when dissatis-
fied- and it exists most distinctively at the local level. Public life at the
local level is much more idiosyncratic than national public life, and much
less homogenized: it is primarily at the local level that we are given to
wild enthusiasms about sports teams, parades, and bizarre public art;
these idiosyncrasies survive even what has been called the "mailing of
America." 99
These local peculiarities tell us something important about the char-
acter of local government, and about its relation to Anti-Federalist ideas
of self-rule. There is a reason for the heterogeneity of local communities
vis-a-vis each other: people have a choice about the community in which
they live, in a way that they do not have so much choice about the state
or especially nation in which they are citizens. To some degree, people
choose their localities according to compatibility with their own wishes
and needs. This, in turn, requires local governments to be careful about
the practices they adopt and the reputations they acquire, so that they
will not frighten away desired citizens. This is not new; the Anti-Feder-
alists themselves were accustomed to American communities in which
dissatisfied persons could and did exit, in order to form communities
more to their own liking. 100
The opportunities for local exit-perhaps even more than for
voice-establish a connection between local entities and voluntary orga-
96 See, eg., Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in Local Government Law, 86
MICH. L. REv. 930 (1988) (discusses participation under rubric of plebiscites, contrasts with other
voting mechanisms; non-voting forms of participation not considered).
97 See, eg., Tarlock, Anywhere but Here: An Introduction to State Control of Hazardous-Waste
Facility Location, 2 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 3 (1981) (local activism against unwanted land
uses).
98 See A. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 95, at 15-16 (exit is the ability to depart or withdraw.).
99 W. KOWINSKI, THE MALLING OF AMERICA (1985).
100 See K. LOCKRIDGE, A NEW ENGLAND TowN: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 100-16 (1970)
(dissenting New England colonists left villages to form new ones). See also T. BENDER, COMMU-
NMl-, AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA, 73 (2d ed. 1982) (1978) (practice of dividing towns in
eighteenth century).
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nizations. 10' What makes a voluntary organization "voluntary" is that
one can enter and leave at one's own volition; to a considerable degree,
one can do the same thing with one's locality. One signal of this affinity
between local governments on the one hand, and voluntary organizations
on the other, is that we have great difficulty in sorting out the differences
between "public" local governments and "private" planned communi-
ties. 102 Indeed, the whole distinction between public and private be-
comes blurred locally,10 3 particularly when we think that people choose
their localities in more or less the same ways that they choose the condo-
minium or the retirement community in which they will live. I will come
back to this exit characteristic shortly, because it is this aspect of local
government-related as it is to Anti-Federalist conceptions of local au-
tonomy-in which modern scholarship has made some particularly inter-
esting contributions. 0 4
Now we return to the earlier question: did the Anti-Federalists lose
entirely? I think not, when we take political practice into account-or at
least not so much as some seem to think. 10 5 We see a number of the
Anti-Federalist attitudes and concerns in our local politics: the accept-
ance of community definitions of the rights and responsibilities of prop-
101 See also Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1531 (1988) (associating voluntary
organizations with national civic republicanism). But see Sullivan, supra note 43, at 1716 (noting
conflict between modem national civic republicanism and voluntary organizations); Cover, The
Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1983) (contrast-
ing intense and sometimes exclusive local groups against national or universalist "empire").
102 See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 1501, 1523, 1526, 1547-63 (1946) (acts of company town
may be "state action"). Compare Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L.
REv. 1519 (drawing analogies between municipalities and homeowners associations but suggesting
that "public" municipalities are marked by presence of involuntary members; also suggesting vote in
municipalities be based on economic stakes comparable to votes in homeowners associations) with
Frug, Cities and Homeowners Associations: A Reply, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1589 (rejecting Ellickson's
view that cities are less voluntary organizations than homeowners associations).
103 This may be the reason for the interest in local government among some scholars who reject
the liberal public/private distinction. See Frug, supra note 102, at 1591; Frug, supra note 95, at
1127-29.
104 Particularly important is Charles Tiebout's seminal article, A Pure Theory of Local Expendi-
tures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956), suggesting that local governments might be envisioned as firms
that offer competing packages of goods and services, and that are selected by residents for their
respective "packages." This article has generated a great deal of commentary, described by Clayton
Gillette as a "major academic industry." See Gillette, Equality and Variety in the Delivery of Munic-
ipal Services (Book Review), 100 HARV. L. REv. 946, 956 n. 29. The opportunities for local exit may
also tend to make communities (or neighborhoods within larger localities) internally homogeneous,
just as they are externally heterogeneous. This characteristic local homogeneity is repugnant to
some. See, eg., R. ELLICKSON & D. TARLOCK, LAND-USE CONTROLS 812 (1981) (comparing the
Tiebout approach to the "Waring Blender" approach). But internal homogeneity does relate mod-
em localities to an Anti-Federalist concern that republican government required like-mindedness
and relative equality among the citizenry. See I STORING, supra note 39, at 15.
105 Cf, eg., J. Tulis, The Modern Presidency and Domestic Policy (Sept. 2-5, 1987) (delivered at
American Pol. Sci. Ass'n. meeting, Chicago, Illinois) (using Anti-Federalist oppositional arguments,
and their rejection, to prove commitments actually made in ratification of Constitution).
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erty, the concern for virtue and corruption, the possibility for personal
participation or voice, the further possibility for choice through the exit
option.
Lest it be thought that all American government has been "consoli-
dated" in principle through the operations of the Federalist Constitution,
and that we are simply awaiting the eventual and inevitable demise of
local self-rule, we should recall that our history reflects a tenacious and
continuous countercurrent to most efforts to centralize local functions.
Thus, the later nineteenth century's judicial doctrine of "Dillon's Rule,"
which held that municipal powers should be read narrowly, was an-
swered in the early twentieth century by Euclid v. Ambler Realty, which
gave back, under land use auspices, the local authority supposedly taken
away by Dillon's restrictive reading. 10 6 Similarly, in the 1970s, the
mechanisms of the "Quiet Revolution" in land use controls, supposedly
subjecting local decisions to much greater state control, were just as qui-
etly redominated by local governments.10 7 In these and other instances
of stubborn local particularism, one sees the evolution of a kind of Anti-
Federalist praxis, almost invisible in an intellectual environment of over-
whelmingly Federalist theory.
B. Echoes in Theory: Anti-Federalism and the Rethinking of
Federalist Theory
The Anti-Federalist tradition has indeed not been a very strong
strand in our political theory, and this seems to me a serious gap; insofar
as Anti-Federalist thinking is overlooked, we are overlooking an impor-
tant part of our own political tradition. Happily, this seems to be in the
process of rectification, both from the direction of a renewed historical
interest in the civic republican tradition, 108 and from the very different
direction of economic analysis and the "regulatory competition" among
local communities. 10 9 This is particularly important, because the local
106 For Dillon's Rule, see Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Govern-
ment: The Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 83, 88-89. Williams also
discusses a theory of local autonomy that she identifies with the 19th century jurist Thomas Cooley.
Id. at 88, 145-49. Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926) upheld the constitutionality of local
zoning.
107 See U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROLS
(1971). For continuing local dominance, see Callies, The Quiet Revolution Revisited, 46 J. AM.
PLAN. A. 135, 136, 139 (1980) (real effect of "revolution" may have been to strengthen local domi-
nance in land use).
108 See, e-g., J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT, supra note 70; see also F. Mc-
DONALD, supra note 47, at 66-77; G. WOOD, supra note 26, at 46-90. For a survey, see Shalhope,
Republicanism and Early American Historiography, 39 WM. & MARY Q. 334 (1982). Legal scholarly
interest has been informed by this historical literature, see supra note 38, though subject to some
caveats, e.g., Powell, Reviving Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1703, 1707, 1711 (1988) (noting anach-
ronistic character of recent legal interest in civic republicanism).
109 See Tiebout, supra note 104; see also Ellickson, supra note 102, at 1547-54; Gillette, supra note
104, at 956.
84:74 (1989)
HeinOnline -- 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 99 1989-1990
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
governmental aspect of our tradition-as Tocqueville said of our volun-
tary organizations-could modify the tendencies that we otherwise may
have to fall into a timorous and deadening conformity, and into an obses-
sion with getting and spending that discourages participation in public
life. 110
One of the areas in which the Anti-Federalist tradition of localism
might help us to rethink our political theory stems from the exit option at
the local level, and in the new reflection that this might cast on the Fed-
eralist's famous discussion of faction. To state the matter succinctly, it
may be that the problem of faction is an artifact of that very "extended
republic" that, supposedly, was going to render factionalism harmless.
Everyone is by this time tediously aware of the Federalist argument
that we need a large republic as a safeguard against faction.111 Because
of the possibilities for exit from local government, however, we might
question whether faction really is a problem at the local level, and we
might consider whether the Federalist's discussion of faction is in some
ways a red herring. Faction would indeed be a local problem if voice
were the only safeguard against local oppression; in smaller republics,
minority voices can indeed be drowned out. But where localities genu-
inely differ, and where it is possible to move among them, oppression can
be left behind, and even a local penchant for redistribution is muted."12
Let us take the argument a step further: quite contrary to the usual
notion, it is at the central level that faction is the most serious problem.
How do we see this? One way is to consult history, where we see at least
two salient examples. First, the most egregious example of minority op-
pression in our history has been racial discrimination. There is no ques-
tion but that racial discrimination existed at the local level from the very
start, but racism was particularly oppressive because it held sway
throughout an entire region. Blacks attempted to leave that region even
during the days of slavery, only to be greeted by a national fugitive slave
law. 113 In post-Civil War days, at least some relief was available, as
Southern blacks exercised an exit option to arrive at the doubtful im-
provement of the Northern states.114 Racial oppression has required na-
110 1 A DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, supra note 19, at 198-202; see also 2 id. at
114-18, 123-28 (voluntary associations and association with political life); 2 id. at 148-51 (dangers of
commercialism and attendant withdrawal from public life).
111 See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
112 See Ellickson, supra note 102, at 1547-48 (if Tiebout hypothesis works, redistributive pro-
grams wash out). But cf id. at 1553 (intercommunity competition not as strong as Tiebout
suggests).
113 See S. CAMPBELL, THE SLAVE CATCHERS. ENFORCEMENT OF THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW,
1850-1860 (1968). The author makes the point that, although the statute was ineffective, it was not
for reasons of nonenforcement by federal officials. Id. at 167-69. If anything, the reason was the
indifference or downright obstruction by Northern localities. See, e.g., id. at 164-65.
114 See, e.g., A. SPEAR, BLACK CHICAGO: THE MAKING OF A NEGRO GHETTO, 1890-1920, at 11
(1967) (80% of Chicago's 1900 population born outside Illinois, most in southern states).
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tional solutions precisely because the pattern of racism has been so
widespread, and so difficult to escape by exit. The example suggests that
more localized oppression, while unquestionably an intolerable evil,
might have been less serious over the long run because localized oppres-
sion might have given a genuine opportunity for escape.
The second example stems from slightly more recent times. It is the
saga of the federal administrative agencies, where we see the dangers of
faction under the modern name of "capture"-and it is capture at the
national level. To put the matter simply, capture of an agency occurs
when the agency adopts the position of a particular interest group, usu-
ally the regulated entity, to the detriment of everyone else. This problem
has plagued the federal administrative agencies from the start, beginning
with the regulation of the railroads under the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission,' 15 and running through the agribusiness domination over water
reclamation projects, to airline -domination of the CAB, and on and
on. 116
At the local level, those fearing oppression through factional "cap-
ture" have two lines of defense. First, they can complain loudly that
their enemies have captured the store, in a context where limited num-
bers at least allow them to be heard-and also allow them the opportu-
nity to organize with fellow complainants and hence magnify individual
voices. Second, they can threaten to cut their losses and leave for a more
favorable regulatory clime-that is, exercise the exit option-a threat
that the locality may well fear because of the damage to its own reputa-
tion, and the danger that other valuable citizens might decide ex ante to
settle elsewhere.
These are not perfect solutions to local factionalism. For one thing,
there is a tension between the voice and exit options, insofar as the possi-
bility for exit may undermine the community spirit represented by
voice-the effort to stay and make things better. For another, some resi-
dents may indeed be "stuck," unable either to exit or to be heard; these
residents may not be assuaged by the knowledge that their plight warns
others to settle elsewhere. But despite these shortcomings, as a compara-
tive matter, exit and voice give local residents at least some leverage and
some chance to overcome factional oppression.
At the national level, on the other hand, the citizen whose interests
115 See G. KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION, 1877-1916, at 233 (1965) (railroads domi-
nated ICC from its inception). But see Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federal-
ism and the Railroad Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017 (1988) (arguing that efficient regulatory scheme
for railroads had to be on national scale).
116 For an attack on a number of agencies thought to be captive to industry, see THE MONOPOLY
MAKERS: RALPH NADER'S STUDY GROUP REPORT ON REGULATION AND COMPETITION (M.
Green ed. 1973). For reclamation, see C. MEYERS, WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 874 (3d ed.
1987) (subsidy to irrigators). For the historical context of the charge of administrative "capture,"
see Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1278-95 (1986).
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are adversely affected by institutional capture has neither of these op-
tions. Voice is more or less useless, because the national government is
too big for most people to get a hearing, unless they get themselves or-
ganized sufficiently to exercise influence. Moreover, large-scale organiza-
tion in itself may not entail freedom from capture, but simply a different
version of capture, as particular members of the organized group use it
for purposes of their own. 117 The exit option is useless for a different
reason: there is nowhere to run, and no alternatives from which to
choose.1 18 Thus, it is at the national level, not the local level, that the
danger of faction most especially requires the trappings of checks and
balances and the play of interest against interest-as is evidenced by nu-
merous proposals for the reintroduction of something like checks and
balances and interest representation into administrative law.119
Publius to the contrary notwithstanding, then, faction is far more a
national problem than a local one. If we think back to the ancient consti-
tution, where every locale and every privileged body had its own institu-
tions and narrow interests, we can see that there is an escape from faction
in such a constitutional structure: each locale may have its foolish enthu-
siasms, but the person who doesn't like them can gripe, or settle else-
where-as Hirschman puts it, exercise a voice or exit option. It is the
large republic that presents the problem of faction-in the sense of one-
sided oppression-in a particularly pointed way. We first learned this
from the oppression of our minority citizenry, and, in more recent years,
we have learned it from the problem of capture in the administrative
state.
117 See, e.g., R. HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 35-37 (1982) (role of "political entrepreneurs" in
organizing and presenting view of large number groups, for reasons of their own). Restraints on
voice have been formalized at the national level-in standing requirements, limitations on taxpayer
suits and the like. One needs a relatively strong personal interest to get a federal hearing. See Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (restraints on standing in federal exclusionary zoning suits); Massa-
chusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (no federal taxpayers' suits); cf Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727 (1972) (relaxed requirements for environmental suits, but plaintiffs must still allege individ-
ual harm to themselves). Some of the recent literature on civic republicanism appears to assume that
the republican tradition of deliberation can be incorporated directly into national politics. See, e.g.,
Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1548 (1988); Michelman, supra note
101, at 1531 (discussing, somewhat more ambiguously, deliberation in civic, local and state bodies as
well as national legislatures); cf. Frug, supra note 95, at 1087; Rose, supra note 90, at 882-87, 911
(special opportunities for deliberation locally).
118 It has been suggested that capture-or the problem of governmental monopolization-should
give rise to special constitutional claims for those left without alternatives. See Williams, Liberty
and Property: The Problem of Government Benefits, 12 J. LEG. STUD. 3 (1983).
119 Sunstein, supra note 5, at 483, 489-90 (need for checks and balances in modern administrative
practice); id. at 505 (efforts at increasing citizen participation); see also Rabin, supra note 116, at
1298-99 (case law challenging "de facto partnership between regulator and regulated," demanding
greater interest group participation).
HeinOnline -- 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 102 1989-1990
Anti-Federalism: "Monarchism" to Modern Localism
C. Crosscurrents: The Federalist Contribution to a Sustained
Anti-Federalist Tradition
I come now to a point that runs quite contrary to the Anti-Federal-
ist critique: the Federalists' plain vanilla Constitution, perversely
enough, does have some important aspects that recommend it, even from
the point of view of preserving a tradition of localism. I am not speaking
only of the obvious point that the Federal Constitution left the states
intact. There are several much more important ways in which the Feder-
alist's victory has assured the continuation of an Anti-Federalist version
of the ancient constitution in the United States.
For one thing, as I have tried to point out, the arguments for the
large republic, with its size and commerce, were in some significant mea-
sure arguments about securing the national defense. The Anti-Federal-
ists never were very convincing on the issue of how the nation could be
defended in the absence of a strong national government. 120 There is
every reason to believe that it has been the large republic of the Federal-
ists that has shielded the Anti-Federalists' smaller communities from the
ravages of external enemies-not to speak of their own mutual strife.
For another thing, the Federalists' plain vanilla Constitution has
created a single nation of states, with minimal difficulties in bringing
goods and persons across boundaries. In this way, the Federalist Consti-
tution is the guarantor of the exit safeguard among local communities. 121
Once again, it is the large republic that makes it possible and safe for
citizens to protect themselves, through exit, from local oppression, and to
build and strengthen their own communities wherever they settle.
Even the commercialism implicit in the Federalist project has an
arguably salutary influence on localism: in assuring the ability of Ameri-
cans to follow commercial pursuits, the plain vanilla Constitution may
have cooled some of the local political fervor from which individuals
might wish to exit. Commercial life, to be sure, sets up a kind of compet-
ing attraction to politics and public life.122 But that is not altogether bad,
as The Federalist authors apparently noticed, because by siphoning off
120 1 STORING, supra note 39, at 27-30. The usual argument was that the people of the states
would voluntarily come to each others' aid in times of peril. See, eg., Comments of Nason, Mass.
ratifying convention, in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 37, at 137; G. Livingston (New York), in 2
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 37, at 297. The Federalists countered with a collective action argu-
ment, and pointed out the recent difficulties in raising money and soldiers during the Revolution.
See, e.g., remarks of Thatcher (Massachusetts), id. at 142; Hamilton (New York), id. at 237; J.
Marshall (Virginia), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 37, at 228. The Anti-Federalist author of
the Letters of Centinel to the People of Pennsylvania boldly took on the Federalists, and asserted
that division and "occasional wars" would be preferable to thd "fangs of despotism" of a consoli-
dated government, 2 STORING, supra note 39, at 186.
121 See T. BENDER, supra note 100, at 87, 96 (national economic and transportation integration
fostered historical local identification and community-building).
122 2 A. DE TOCQ1UEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, supra note 19, at 165; see also A. HIRSCH-
MAN, SHIFTING INVOLVEMENTS (1982) (public and private pursuits in competition).
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partisan ambitions into money-making pursuits, commerce may moder-
ate the temperature of local political issues.' 23 In addition, insofar as
commercial pursuits increase the size of the total wealth "pie," com-
merce can make local issues about dividing the now-more-ample pie
seem less compelling, and may render local political "rent-seeking" less
morally defensible to a locality's own citizens-precisely because this
rent-seeking behavior may decrease total wealth. 124
Moreover, the Federalists' plain vanilla Constitution did, after all,
do something to prevent faction at the national level, too; all those
checks and balances and so forth do play a role in controlling national
aggrandizement. This leaves a space for localities that was impossible in
Napoleon's France (not to speak of Hitler's Germany or Stalin's Russia).
American localities have known how to exploit their opportunities, and
have managed to entrench themselves quite firmly in the consciousness of
national politicians. 125 There is a price to be paid for this entrench-
ment. 126 It may be, however, that the price we pay is worth paying in
order to prevent the absolute rule that might accompany true consolida-
tion. As in Old Regime Europe, it would be unthinkable to unseat estab-
lished local interests without something close to revolution. In a sense,
then, the Federalists' plain vanilla Constitution has incorporated a cer-
tain chocolate layering from the ancient constitution, as translated by the
Anti-Federalist vision of localism. 127
V. CONCLUSION
The Federalist Constitution attacked the ancient constitution, and
chose commerce, uniformity, and size in large part for the sake of na-
tional defense and strength. Insofar as that is true, it might be thought-
as the Anti-Federalists said-that the Federalist Constitution corrupts
the polity by lowering its aims. The choice of the plain vanilla Constitu-
123 Diamond, supra note 57, at 648-49.
124 For "rent-seeking," see, e.g., J. BUCHANAN, R. TOLLISON & G. TULLOCK, TOWARD A THE-
ORY OF THE RENT SEEKING SOCIETY (1980); see also McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Crea-
tion in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEG. STUD. 101 (1987) (political rent-seeking
decreases total wealth). The not-unreasonable assumption of these authors is that more wealth is
better than less, all other things being equal. Some Anti-Federalist arguments, of course, would
suggest that all other things are not necessarily equal, if the pursuit of wealth undermines republican
character. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
125 For two interesting case studies on local lobbying in Congress, see Lee, The Political Safe-
guards of Federalism? Congressional Responses to Supreme Court Decisions on State and Local Lia-
bility, 20 URB. LAW. 301 (1988).
126 An academic industry has arisen on the ability of small and well-organized groups-such as
local lobbyists-to get what they want out of large legislative bodies like Congress. Founding books
are J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1965) and M. OLSON, THE LOGIC
OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965). Notorious examples are the local tenacity in securing sewage treat-
ment plant grants, water projects, and defense installations.
127 For a similar view, though with quite different terminology, see Sullivan, supra note 43, at
1721-23 (proposes "normative pluralism" conception of nation's political organization).
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tion represents a decision that big Babylon is in the long run stronger
than little Athens, and probably even than little Sparta-and that this
strength is more important than civic character or other high-flown re-
publican aspirations.
But it is well to remember that there are many people who really
like Babylon, who prefer its coarseness to noble character, who revel in
its remarkable energy, and find charm in the very vulgarity of its dyna-
mism. 128 Certainly the rhetoric of 1987 made us reflect that there is,
after all, some moral quality to the Federalist Constitution over and
above mere national survival, and that the plain vanilla Constitution has
generated a certain enthusiasm for a way of life, however gleefully crass
and raw it may sometimes seem.
I would like to suggest that a continuing and countervailing Anti-
Federalist and ancient constitutional tradition of localism-like the tra-
dition of voluntary organizations-has enriched the cultural and political
life of the Babylonian large republic, and has even enhanced the commer-
cial vigor of that republic. The local tradition has done so, on the one
hand, by keeping alive a certain cooperative initiative and a belief in the
possibilities for self-help through association, which is likely to be much
easier at the local level. 129 And on the other hand, the local tradition has
enhanced a kind of optimistic self-confidence, by reminding us that it is
always possible to bail out to try something new-that is, by reminding
us about the exit option. With this we are back to the Anti-Federalists'
idea that character must be nourished by institutions. Initiative and opti-
mism are character traits that the Federalist Constitution needs too, not
only for political life but for commerce as well.
If Anti-Federalist localist echoes have sounded in the way that Fed-
eralist constitutionalism has played out over time, however, the reverse is
also true. It is the Federalist Constitution that has protected localities
from external danger, has guaranteed the "exit" option among them,
and-through the promotion of commercialism-has muted their ex-
cesses. As it has turned out, the Federalist program required a dose of
Anti-Federalist character, and vice versa.
128 For an example of the celebration of vulgarity, see R. VENTURI, LEARNING FROM LAs VEGAS
(1972) (praise for Las Vegas "strip" architecture). This fondness for lowlife may be rather prevalent
among Americans, as for example in the remark of a friend of mine: "I like country music," she
said, "because it's so trashy."
129 Tocqueville noted that a nation's commercial success depended on the initiative that could
only be generated in free institutions. See 2 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 19, at 148. He thought
that voluntary organizations, which I have likened to localities, were a major element in American
free institutions.
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